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Abstract
Stagflation and Shortagef lat ton
A Comparative Approach
This paper compares the sources of inflation and unemployment in
western market economies with the sources of repressed inflation and
persistent shortages common in centrally planned economies. Stagflation
and shortagef lation have much in common, and a similar theoretical
structure is offered. Measures of stagflation for the OECD countries
and a first approximation of a measure of shortagef lation for the eastern
European socialist countries reveal that Italy and Poland have the most
severe, and West Germany and East Germany have the lowest rates. Further-
more, where relative prices fail to reflect relative scarcities, then
queuing, gluts, and other allocative inefficiencies arise that can slow
growth.

Stagflation and Shor tagef 1 at i on
:
A Comparative Approach
Contemporary Inflation is a worldwide phenomenon in the sense that
it occurs, hut in different forms, in western market economies and
socialist countries alike. The worldwide character of modern inflation
is also revealed in its International transmission, which does underlie
to some extent the primary focus on the comparisons that follow. The
literature dealing with inflation under socialism is very meagre, and
partlv as a result of this, there is also very little that compares the
hroader forms inflation takes under hoth systems. However there are
interesting new insights such a comparison can offer.
This paper gives special attention to the hasic difference between
the inflation in highly developed largely capitalistic market econo-
mies, generally those of the western nations, and in centrally planned
economies such as those of the eastern European socialist countries.
In the case of the market economies, inflation is open in the sense
that prices generally rise until they settle at a new equilibrium level.
On the other hand, in the socialist countries the inflation is vir-
2tuallv alwavs partly repressed . In an economy of the latter type there
is not an efficient mechanism balancing the quantities demanded with the
quantities supplied. As a consequence the usual administrative central
control of prices of many commodities frequently amounts to periodic
price jumps for some commodities and a repression of the price rise
which is indispensable for reaching a price equilibrium for the others.
There remains an overall unrealized effective demand and shortages of
many commodities therefore which we wi L 1 refer to as "shortagef lat ion.
"
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In the sections that follow, after developing a comparison of
the well known stagflation phenomenon in the West to shortagef lation,
which is its near mirror image in the socialist countries, and after
considering the similar pressures that give rise to each, the paper
will then turn to some of the implications for economic efficiency.
These include effects on the efficiency of resource allocation, on
incentives, on lahor productivity, on growth, on unemployment, and on
the character of the disequilihria in the markets. Since comparing
inflation rates, or unemployment rates, alone is relatively meaning-
less, the next section will then seek to find a common denominator
that can he used for intersystem comparisons. Finallv we will return
to the short run trade-offs—inflation versus unemployment (in the West),
and inflation versus shortages (in the centrally planned economies).
Partly since the literature dealing with inflation under socialism
is so meagre, (see Wilczynski (1977), for example), we feel that this
new perspective offers some interesting new insights into the role of
market incentives and into the impediments to allocative efficiency in
hoth kinds of economic systems.
T. Price Disequilibrium
A fundamental feature on which we propose to focus is that prices
are not perfectly flexible either in western economies, where some are
subsidized or partly inflexible for other reasons—at least in the
short run, or in the socialist economies where they are centrally
planned and adjusted only infrequently. Markets therefore are not in
price equilibrium in the short run in either economy. There are excess
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supplies, or surpluses in some, and excess demands accompanied by shor-
tages in others that persist.
Both the stagflation of western economies and their surpluses,
which sometimes lead to their characterization as economies of surplus,
are partiallv related to these wage and price inflexibilities. In
labor markets both money and real wage rates for many types of employ-
ment are reasonably inflexible downward as demand declines, or at least
their adjustment lags as part of the dynamic cyclical adjustment pro-
cess, resulting in unemployment at existing wage and salary rates.
Whether this is due to errors and misperceptions in planning, as the
new classical economists would have it, or to minimum wage laws,
multiple year labor contracts, instinctive resistence to being made
worse off, or other sources of short run inflexibilities, as other eco-
nomists would conclude, labor market surpluses nevertheless appear.
Similarly agricultural prices are held above their equilibrium level,
in this case by government agricultural price supports in the United
States, France, Germany, Britain, and many other western countries.
Surpluses of wheat, cheese, tobacco, corn, and other supported com-
modities appear and fill up the warehouses. Tn markets for manufac-
tured goods, where suppliers have a degree of monopoly power, such as
in electric and gas utilities in the U.S., in some durables, and
certainly in markets dominated by international cartels, prices are
usually held somewhat above a purely competitive eaui librium.
Inventories persist, and if the sellers are not able to limit entry,
excess supplies and surpluses are even more evident.
This situation is shown in Figure 1A, which is typical of a number
of major factor or product markets. The 'price is somewhat above the
p*
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A. Western Market Economies;
Selected Major Markets
B. Centrally Planned Economies;
Other Maior Markets
Figure 1. Surpluses and Shortages in Commodity and Factor Flows
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equilihrium level nnich of the time, and in these markets, larger inven-
tories persist and surpluses appear.
In contrast, the situation more typical of centrally planned econ-
omies is shown in Figure IB. There the governments such as those
throughout eastern Europe and some LDCs set the prices centrally, and
3
typically hold down prices, especially of food and other necessities.
The Soviet Union, for example, is proud of the fact that the price of
food has not increased since 1957. In Poland, although there have heen
periodic lumps, there have also heen long periods in hetween where the
consumer prices have heen held at stahle and at lower levels than is
consistent with the purchasing power available. The result is repressed
inflation, unsatisfied excess demand, and persistent shortages of these
commodities as illustrated in Figure 1R. Since price is not performing
its normal rationing function, there are long queues, goods are
rationed by means of the high cost to the buyer of standing in line,
and an economy of shortages emerges. This is a simple comparison, but
one that is frequently overlooked.
II. The Theory of Stagflation and Shortagef lation
Stagflation and shortagef lation are illustrated in Figure 2. They
are both dynamic concepts since the inflation rate, which is the percen-
tage rate of increase in prices with respect to time, is measured on the
vertical axis and related to either the level of unemployment (to the
right) or to the size of the shortages (to the left).
When considering the degree of stagflation shown on the right, this
can be analyzed by use of both the short run Phillips curves shown as
shifting and the longer run Phillips curve that the shifting shorter run
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Philllps curves generate. The Long run curve is of the type that ts
intended to he empirically relevant. All points on hoth SR and LR
curves involve the coexistence of some positive amount of hoth infla-
tion and unemployment, which is characteristic of stagflation. Stag-
flation is worse, of course, at some times than at others and in some
countries than in other countries. Several points are plotted for the
U.S., U.K., and other OECD countries to ca I L attention to this.
Shortagef lat ion, to the left, can also he analyzed into shifting
short run and longer run relations. But now the central planning
a^encv selects the inflation rate, which is done empiricallv of course
by setting the Level of all prices, not ."just for food and necessities,
hut also for luxuries, and then changing some or all of these prices
periodically. Each inflation rate chosen at a given level of excess
aggregate demand will he associated with a different degree of supply
shortage. The given overall level of excess aggregate demand is
usually due to major public investment, defense, and social service
efforts that are not fully financed with turnover and income taxes.
So severe repression of the inflation rate which means that price can-
not perform its normal rationing function is associated with larger
shortages and longer queues. Other things the same, the wider the
deviation of prices from the equilibrium price the longer the queues.
Conversely, the closer the price adjustments to the free market prices,
and hence to an open inflation rate, the less severe the shortages.
In this case the inflation rate is acting as a tax, albeit a somewhat
cruel and capricious one.
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Stagf lat ion : Rising Prices Accompanied by Excess Capacity and
Unemployment
Further attention will soon be devoted to these problems of macro-
economic stabilization in the socialist countries because they have been
less welL analyzed in the literature. But first some further remarks
about the causes of inflation and unemployment in the western O.E.C.D.
and third world market economies will facilitate the comparisons.
Short Run Phillips Curves . The short run modified Phillips Curves
shown in Figure 2 reflect price inflation as a function of the size of
the product gap in the products markets as well as the rate of wage
infLation which in turn is dependent in a major way on the level of
unemployment in the factor markets. Using Okun ' s law, which relates
the size of the products gap to the size of the unemployment gap in
the factor markets, the product and factor gap terms can be collapsed
into one, as will be demonstrated below, and the product price infLa-
tion rate expressed as a function of merely the unemployment rate in
the reduced form price equation. It is these "modified Phillips curves"
that have been illustrated in Figure 2.
The shifts in the short run relationship illustrated in Figure 2
are an inherent part of the process, and of the modern theory of
inflation. There are three major sources of these shifts within each
country at different points in time, and therefore as between
countries when comparing several countries at a single point in time.
At any given level of aggregate demand (i.e., thinking for the moment
of the shifts as directly vertical shifts), upward shifts have been
caused by increases in raw material and crude oil prices, by expectations
on the higher inflation rate (whatever the cause) gets built-in to wage
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rate contracts empirical Lv, raising the wage infLation rate and by
slower productivity growth. These elements depending upon the level of
employment, wage rate expectations, productivity, interest cost
factors, and raw material price shocks are summarized as demand-pull,
core, and shock inflation rate components. Not all are necessarily
operating at any given time, and as between countries different com-
binations of these sources are present. In the U.S., for example, in
1986, there is little evidence of excess demand (with unemployment
still relatively high) or of shock inflation (with oil prices falling
and the prices of raw materials supplied bv the third world lower).
Almost all of the approximately 3 percent inflation rate that remains
therefore is "core" inflation resulting from the lag in adjustments of
labor contracts, cost-based reimbursement health care price increases,
built-in social security and armed forces pension indexation, and the
like. The United States therefore is shown on the lower short run
Phillips curve, which has shifted downward from where it was earlier
before aggregate demand was reduced by use of tight monetary policies.
Raw material price shocks have slackened off, inflationary expectations
have started to get worked out of the system, and after the earlier 1982
trough of 10.9 percent unemployment was reached, the recovery has started
to help productivity to start rising again.
This familiar wage price interaction process is developed further,
together with careful empirical estimates, bv Bruno and Sachs (1985),
Eckstein (1983, Ch. 13), Goodman and McMahon (1979) and is updated
monthly in the chapter on "Prices, Wages, and Productivity" in the Data
Resources Inc. Review of the U.S. Economy . International applications
of this modified Philiips Curve for the OECD countries are tested by
Paldam (1980).
Productivity Growth . To get more specific about the role of pro-
ductivity growth, which is particularly interesting where inter-
national comparisons are involved, as well as about the relation of
these shifting short run Phillips curves to an empirically relevant
longer run relation such as that shown in Figure 2, it is necessary to
set out the underlying wage and price equations, and to derive the
reduced form price equation which reveals the sources of the shifts
and their longer run effects.
Equation (1) below shows the price equation, equation (2) is the
wage equation, (3) is Okun's law, (4) lets expectations get fully built-
in, and (5) is the modified Phillips equation, obtained as a reduced
form solution for this wage-price-employment sector by combining (l)-(4):
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where
p = the price infLation rate and w = the wage inflation rate,
Y = real GDP, and Y = potential real GDP, so that (Y -Y)/Y
= the products market gap,
(y-n) = lahor productivity growth, measured here as the percent
change in real GDP(v) less the percent change in employment
(n),
p = the percent change in energy and raw material prices,
E
U = unemployment and U„ = the natural rate estimated at 4.5% in
Figure 2, and
it = the expected inflation rate. All other terms are parameters.
Equation (5) summarizes demand pull, core, and shock sources of
inflation in western market economies. Using econometric estimates of
the parameters, the equations can he used to plot the shifting short
run Phillips curves in Figure 2 (if equation (4) is omitted), and they
generate the long run Phillips curves if equation (4) is used. Since
3~ is known to he close to one, and a„ to be significantly less than one
by most econometric estimates at least for the U.S., Germany, Japan, and
Denmark (see Paldam (1980), McMahon (1986), and Eckstein and Girola
(1978), for example), the longer run empirically relevant Phillips
curve is not vertical, hut is steeper than the short run Phillips
curves as shown in Figure 2. Furthermore, since the absolute value of
the negative parameter B -. is larger than the absolute value of 8 9a„ in
empirical estimates, faster productivity growth will help to shift the
short (and long run) Phillips curves downward. a_ measures the extent
to which productivitv increases get buiLt-in to wages and salaries, and
3_ the extent to which the benefit of productivity increases tends to
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be passed forward to final consumers through lower product prices.
There are differences among countries in this regard which may help to
explain why the shorter run Phillips curves are higher for some countries
such as the U.K. , Belgium, and the Netherlands even though they may be
at the same stage in their business cycle movements.
There is an inverse relationship to that described above for each
of the sources of shortagef lation in the socialist countries. Rut
before turning to that, further description of the nature of this pheno-
menon in the centrally planned economies should be of interest and will
help to set the stage.
III. Shortagef lation: Partially Repressed Ir.f!^r-:on with Shortages
The fundamental feature of an inflation under socialism is its
dual character (see Kolodko (1984) and (1986)). On one hand the
inflation is revealed in the "classic" way, i.e., through a rise in
the price level , and on the other hand through additional un s atisfied
excess demand which reveals itself in market shortages and hence in
continuing market diseaui librium. The more or less permanent existence
of this excess demand is a direct result of the persistent tendency
toward repression of the inflationary price increases. The consequence
for the economy is chronic shortage which then leads to inefficient
resource allocation and other problems.
Reasons for Repression of Inflation
The first reason for repression of inflation is linked to the
long-time conviction that a repression of price increases will facili-
tate investment projects and thereby aid economic growth. The main-
tenance of relatively lower prices reduces however the response to
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growing consumption demand. As a consequence the household sector is
forced to save part of its money income. From a macroeconomic point
of view it means that consumption is lower to the extent of the invol-
untary savings. So forced savings come into being as the result of
the repression of the inflationary price growth . This forced saving
does release some resources to produce investment goods since these
are full employment economies. But the liquid assets also constitute
an inflationary overhang. 4 A second closely related reason for the
repression of inflation issues from the conviction that a relatively
stable price level favors the increase of labor productivity. With
less inflation, monev wafije increases are also real wage increases, and
this change in the distribution of income toward labor is thought to
increase labor effort.
The third reason is the conviction that lower prices of food and
necessities redistribute real income to lower income groups. This
reason is not based on the relation of wages to productivity, but
instead stresses equity and equality for lower income groups.
These reasons can only be justified if the repressed inflation is
temporary and the shortages are limited. The reality, however, is
that repressed inflation and the attendant shortages are chronic phe-
nomena in many socialist economies. The economic system demonstrates
a permanent tendency toward excess demand and, consequently, toward
supply shortages.
The Effects from Repression of Inflation
This results in all sorts of problems that reduce the effective-
ness of the investment and reduce labor productivity which turn
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finally against economic growth. Under the circumstances of repressed
inflation prices do not reflect relative scarcities. In most cases
they are not set on the hasis of the relation hetween supply and demand
but on a cost-based reimbursement basis or cost-plus pricing. On this
basis the price structure is distorted away from one which reflects
the resource costs of production and relative demands for their alter-
nate uses, and therefore the price signals are false . In such a
situation the allocation of factors—both of capital and labor— is far
away from an optimal allocation. Eventually this leads to reduced
economic efficiency.
The repression of the inflation also affects labor productivity
negatively. The shortage is accompanied by a set of negative
phenomena in the relation between the market and households, for
example. The waste of time standing in long lines, forced substitu-
tion of products, involuntary savings, administrative rationing of
goods in short supply, and bribery unequivocally affect household
satisfaction and labor productivity in a negative way.
Therefore, what are the real reasons for repressing inflation in
the centrally planned economies, since the intended results do not seem
to respond to realitv? We can indicate two essential reasons: one is
economic and the other political. The key economic reason is linked
to a basic feature of a socialist economy. It is an unlimited
investment demand, which then leads to excess aggregate demand. Janos
Kornai (1980, pp. 478-9) has observed that:
The volume of investment does not depend on the financial
state of the firms' sector, its present and future profits,
accumulated or additional savings, the condition of the state
budget, or (the constraint of) expected sales. It would be a
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mistake to omit these factors from a growth model of a capi-
talist economy
—
just as it would be a mistake to include them
in the present model (of a socialist economy).
As a consequence the expansion drive causes many bottlenecks, dis-
equilibrium, and chronic shortages. As this affects the household
sector, the purchasing power generated by investment results in excess
demand, and the shortages of consumer goods follow as the direct result
of the repression of the resulting inflation.
The causes of this continuing use of repressed inflation in the
long term lie not in its political and economic popularity since no
government relishes shortages and dissatisfied workers. But it lies in
two more subtile political conditions. The first comes from the con-
viction that government is better and more efficient if the rate of
price growth is lower. The second is the long-term force of habit of a
re lat ivelv stable price level, and the larger reactions that occur when
the discrete price changes are made. This links to the price setting
policv in centrally planned economies. There is a deep conviction that
the price level does not depend on production costs and market rela-
tions, but on "good" or "ill" behavior by the State. This is not
surprising since the basic responsibility for price formulation is con-
centrated at the central level, i.e., in the hands of State. Therefore
a government is always under political pressure not to pass the price
increases through. This repression of cost increase is impossible in a
market economy, but it is done in centrally planned and directed econo-
mies. Since it can be done it is done.
These considerations lead to the conclusion that the existence of
repressed inflation, excess demand, and shortages are possible in an
economy even though monetary policy does not perform an active role.
-14-
In a centrally planned economy there is no monetary policy as it is
known in the West. Instead the supply of money for the firms' sector
is automatically adjusted to the uses for funds for transactions. That
is, the firms' expenditures are constrained by the physical quantities
of inputs supplied, not by the effective demand for output. The finan-
cial flows adjust to these real production processes—not the contrary.
The financial resources for effective demand and the interest rates
charged for funds are not a constraint, and the inputs and other
commodities—on the other hand—are scarce.
The simple effect of the typical performance of these quantitative
controls continues the dilemma of choosing between a higher rate of
inflation and lower shortages—versus a lower rate of inflation and
greater shortages . There are of course many constraints on this choice
both of a political and of an economic nature, just as there are in
western market economies choosing between inflation and unemplovment.
The Effective Rate of Inflation in an Economy Where There Are Shortages
Is it justified to identify the shortage only with repressed
inflation, or should the costs of the shortages also be counted and
added to the (repressed) prices in some kind of a welfare index?
First in terms of quantities, there is the overall market require-
ment that aggregate excess demand is equal to the aggregate shortage of
supply. Second, the repressed inflation followed by the shortage still
has some of the same effects as an open inflation in general. Even in
the presence of repressed inflation, the price level never is entirely
stable. Some prices are changed upward periodically. Some change in
the black market, or in the farmers' markets.
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But to the extent that a shortage persists, the actual real prices
of the goods In short supply are higher than their money prices hecause
the situation is accompanied hy the queuing costs horn for purchase of
particular goods that can he measured in lost joh time (within which a
real wage that can he added to the monev price could have heen earned)
plus the value of lost leisure time which has heen wasted during the
search for desired consumer and producer goods. Third, the repressed
inflation—even under a hypothetical situation of totally constant
prices— is attended hy a depreciation of the value of monev and its
capacitv to purchase goods which is like a tax (in place of a higher
original price), an effect that is also an inherent attrihute of infla-
tion. However, in this case the depreciation does not reveal itself
in the purchase of a smaller quantity of goods for each unit of money
hut instead in the complete impossihility of spending part of one's
disposahle income.
Fourth, where there is an administrative repression of price
increases there are redistrihution effects . Finally, the repressed
inflation is accompanied hy an excess of money in circulation. This
does not necessarily mean that the monev supply has increased in the
current period, hut instead that unspent halances have heen carried
over from the past, and that the monev supply has increased excessively
at a previous time.
So, the repression of price increases does not eliminate these
costs of inflation, including the periodic price increases that are
not repressed, the time-costs of queuing, the redistrihution of income
and wealth, and depreciation of money in the sense that it cannot huy
goods.
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Conflicting Viewpoints
Janos Kornai (1980, p. 498) tries to discount the inflation-shortage
trade-off, suggesting that:
There is a causal relationship in one direction:
the shortage strengthens the tendency towards price
—
drift. But there is no casual relationship In the
opposite direction (...). A constant price level,
a fall in price, and a rise in price are equally
compatihle with the permanent maintenance of the
normal intensity of shortage. Norms of shortage are
not eternal, hut no price change, in either direc-
tion, can on its own alter them in the long run.
But are the price elasticities of demand and supply hoth zero, even in
the long run? Does the fact that the shorgage is chronic mean that
there is no possibility of choosing higher prices and lesser shortages?
Under socialism any such rise in the price level implies a wage
increase that supports further demand expansion. Since nominal income
goes up faster than real output the long run Phillips curve as it rela-
tes to shortagef lation (Fig. 2 and Eq. (5)) becomes almost completely
vertical and the shortage persists.
TV. Stagflation and Shortagef lation : Eventual Possibilities
for More Comprehensive Empirical Analysis
One interesting kind of comparison can be made by comparing the
familiar "unhappiness index" for western market economies, which is
merely the sum of the inflation rate and the unemployment rate, with
an analogous index consisting of the sum of the overall rate of shor-
tages and the open inflation rate in each socialist economy.
For western market economies, the inflation rate, the unemployment
rate, and the combined unhappiness index, or stagf lat ion rate
,
is
shown in Table 1. The countries are ranked by the size of their infla-
tion rate in 1984 as shown in the first column, whereas the rank of
es
Table 1
Inflation, llnemp 1 oyment and Stagflation Rat
in Western Mark et Economies
1984 and 1980-84 Average
Rank of
Inf lation Unemployment Stagf Lation Stagf Lat io n
Rate a Rate Rate " 1984 1980-84
Italy 1984
1980-84
France 1984
1980-84
Other Industrial
Countries 1984
1980-84
Great Rritain 1984
1980-84
Canada 1984
1980-84
U.S.A. 1984
1980-84
West Germany 1984
1980-84
Japan 1984
1980-84 3.9 2.4 6.3 8
Source: World Economic Outlook International Monetary Fund
,
Washington, D.C., April 1985, pp. 209, 213.
Consumer Price Index.
Composites of the country groups are in the relevant percentages
for each country weighted by the average dollar value of that country's
GN'P over the preceding three years.
10.7 10.4
16.4 9.0
7.4 10.0
11.2 8.2
6.5 11.4
8.9 9.2
5.0 12.7
6.0 10.6
4.4 11.3
8.7 9.9
4.3 7.5
7.5 8.3
2.4 8.1
4.5 6.3
2.2 2.7
21.1 1
25.4
17.4 4
19.4
17.9 2
18.1
17.7 3
16.6
15.7 5
18.6
11.8 6
15.8
10. 5 7
10.8
4.9 8
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their composite stagflation rate is shown in the two right hand columns
for 1984 and 1980-84 respectively. By this measure, the highest
stagflation rates are found for the 1980-84 period as a whole in Italy,
France and Canada, whereas the lowest stagflation rates are found in
the U.S., West Germany and Japan.
For the centrally planned economies, an analogous rate of shortage -
f lation can be computed. It is simply the sum of the rate of open
inflation plus the rate of shortage. To conceptualize the rate of
shortage that needs to be measured we refer to Figure 3. There the
excess demand at the centrally set price level (P.) is the distance
(Z-Y ). Expressed in percentage terms, this rate of shortage (r. ) is:
Z - Y
p
This shortagef lation rate then is merely the sum of the actual inflation
rate and the rate of shortage:
P
l
" P Z " YP
(7) r SF
= — +
-Y^~ = P + rSH
where r = percent rate of shortage
SH
r„„ = shortagef lation rate
SF
p = rate of open inflation, as in Figure 2.
The shortage (see Figure 3) is a function of the size of the
excess demand (i.e., of distance Z-Y ), or of the slope (which is
P
9 P
related to the elasticity of demand) — times the extent to which the
o Y
centrally set prices are held helow their equilibrium levels (P~ - P])«
There are almost impossible difficulties in finding data either for
the size of the shortages or alternatively for the elasticity of demand
PRICE
OtMANO
R&AL 0\)TPUf
nn = Op/byMp^-Pj)
P~ = Last period's price level
P. = This period's actual price level (repressed inflation)
p = Inflation rate = (P -P.J/P
(P„-P ) = Extent to which centrally set prices repress inflation
(Z-Y ) = Quantitative extent of excess demand (shortages) at the new
price level P.
The shortage = a. function of the size of the excess demand (i.e., of
-l pdistance Z-Y ), or of the elasticity of demand (3P/3Y) — and of the size
of the repression (P--P ) o_f prices .
Figure 3: Repressed Inflation in Centrally Planned F.conomv
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and the extent to which prices are repressed (P„ - P. ) in the socialist
countries under discussion. Only for Poland is such data reasonably
available (see Kolodko (1985)). However, based on sample data for
selected markets in the other socialist countries, it is possible to
develop a first approximation of the size of the shortages in each. It
is possible to estimate the severity of the shortages through—for
example—the length of waiting time for an apartment (in Poland about
15 years), or for a car (about ten years in East Germany). Some
impressionistic estimates can be made from our observations of the time
spent waiting in shopping lines for food (especially meat in some
countries under discussion) and for durables. It would be difficult,
but not impossible, to collect more systematic data on these aspects.
A weighted average of the shortages is equal to aggregated excess demand
(i.e., ED at Figure 3).
Another approach is to deduct the sum of the desired savings and
liquid asset balances from the total value of the population's liquid
asset balances:
(9) ED = R - (S +T )
m v r
where ED = shortage
R = population's total liquid asset balances
m
S = voluntarv savings
v
T = demand for money for transaction and precautionary purposes,
This does give a conceptual estimate of the inflationary overhang, but
it is not free from methodological complications. They are the problems
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involved in accurate estimation of which function of totaL assets con-
stitutes voluntary savings and desired transaction balances. Estimates
have to he based on assumptions about consumers' time-preference,
households' management of liquid assets, the propensity to save, and
the velocity of money. However, again for a first approximation, we
assume that voluntary savings include those liquid assets placed in
bank accounts in the form of special-purpose and long-term deposits
plus about one-third of demand deposits. Voluntary savings should
thus be understood as all deposits for some specific purpose, including
retirement, or for the sake of prudence. With respect to desired
transaction balances, this estimate is based on the average income
earned in the three major groups of the population and the length of
the pay periods. The latter is two weeks for wage earners and social-
benefit recipients, and one and a half months for private farms and
private businesses. Compulsory savings of the population in the form
of excess bank deposits are then simply the difference between total
demand deposits and that part desired for transactions purposes as
indicated above. Based on these criteria, admittedly somewhat
unsystematic observation, a first approximation estimate of the rate
of shortage is offered for each of the seven east European socialist
countries in Table 2. The shortages are largest for the 1977-84
period as a whole in Poland, Romania, and the Soviet Union and smallest
in Hungary.
The Shortagef lat ion Rate
The shortagef lat ion rates for these socialist countries are shown
in Table 3. Thev are merely the sum of the inflation rates and the
shortage rates shown in Table 2.
Tahle 2
Rate of Inflation and Rate of Shortages
in Socialist Countri<>8 in 1977--84
Country 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984
Average
Rate
Bulgaria Inf lation:
Shortages
:
1
4
1
4
5
3
14
3 3
1
4
3
3
1
4
3.2
3.5
Czechoslovakia Inf Lation :
Shortages
2
3
2
3
4
3
2
3
1
3
4
3
1.
3
1
3
2.1
3
East Germany Inflation
Shortages 3 3 3
1
3 3 3 3 3
0.1
3
Hungary Inflation:
Shortages:
4
2
5
2
10
2
9
2
5
2
7
2
7
2
8
2
6.8
2
Poland Inf Lation
Shortages
6
2
8
3
7
4
9
6
21
8
101
4
20
5
15
6
23.4
4. /
Romania Inf lation:
Shortages
L
4
1
4
L
4
2
4
2
4
17
2
5
3
8
4
4.6
3.6
Soviet Union Inf lation
Shortages 4
1
4
1
4
1
3
1
3
4
3
1
4
-1
4
1
3.6
Source: Inflation: "Rocznik Statystyczny" ("Statistical Yearhook"),
GUS, Warszawa, various issues.
Shortages: First approximations hased on observations of the
elements descrihed in the text for the 7 socialist countries.
Table 3
Average Rate of Sbortagef lat ion in Socialist Countries in 1977-84
Count rv Shortagef lation Rate
Bulgaria
Czechos lovakia
East Germany
Hungary
Poland
Romania
Soviet Union
6.9
5.1
3.1
8.9
28.1
8.3
4.6
Source: Sum of elements in Table 2,
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The most acute rates of shortagef lation are in Poland, followed by
Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria. East Germany has had both a lower
actual inflation rate and a relatively lower rate of shortages than
most of the others. Hungary, however, has had considerably less acute
shortages, although this has been accompanied by a higher rate of open
inflation.
Comparing these shortagef lation rates to the stagflation rates
shown in Table 1 for the western market economies is interesting, if
the appropriate qualifications are stressed. They are not directly
comparable welfare indices. Rut the comparison is more legitimate than
comparing open inflation rates alone, or unemployment rates alone,
ignoring the effects of the shortages. Tn Table 1, Italy had the worst
stagflation rate (25.4%), somewhat comparable to Poland's shortage-
f lation in the East (28.1%). West Germany had the best stagflation
rate (10.8%) most comparable to the relatively lower rates of shortage-
flation in East Germany, Czechoslovakia, the USSR, or Hungary.
CONCLUSIONS
Inflation in market economies does not reveal itself in the same
way that it does in the centrally planned economies. We find that the
comparison of the intensity of open inflation alone is relatively
meaningless. What may be /justified among countries with similar econo-
mic systems cannot be used without criticism for intersystem comparisons.
There are somewhat analogous trade-offs within each system: inflation
versus unemployment in the western market economies, and inflation ver-
sus shortages in the socialist economies. We have set out an equation
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structure that could be applied to both, replacing only the unemployment
term with a measure of the severity of the overall shortages.
In the centrally planned economies, supply shortages lead to forced
savings, some of which are not invested. This can result in relatively
slower growth of output not only for that reason, but also because of
the allocative inefficiency involved. In the market economies supply
shortages are infrequent, but there are instead surpluses of goods and
other stimuli to consumption. In part, one result of this is not forced
savings, but instead too little savings. This then in turn, also
results in slower growth.
In the centrallv planned economies as prices are held down, this
contributes to shortages and allocative inefficiency. But lest one be
too hasty, that is not all that is different from the market economies
where there are price supports, and other sources of rigidities of prices
above equilibrium levels, followed by surpluses, and again allocative
inefficiencies.
A case can be made of course for replacing the price system when
there is market failure. Market failure can occur when there is mono-
poly, or very noor levels of information, or when there are exter-
nalities. In the case of externalities, since the price system does not
work, there normally must be subsidies to get a sufficient quantity of
the public good in question produced. A case also can be made (prefer-
ably by other means) for making some corrections to the income distri-
bution both within western market economies and within socialist
economies alike. But when the price system is not allowed to reflect
relative resource scarcities, or to signal bottlenecks and relative
-22-
intensity of demands, there Is a price to be paid as the result of
allocative inefficiency, forced saving, and slower growth.
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Foot notes
For a survev of the literature and of the theory concerning this
suhject of worldwide inflation see Choi (1985). See also Krause and
Salant (1977), Lindberg and Maier (1984), and Bruno and Sachs (1985).
"Repressed inflation has not been common in the western economies
except in extreme cases such as in World War II and the years imme-
diately following the war. On repressed inflation under capitalism
see Hicks (1947), Paish (1953), and Charlesworth (1955).
30n inflation in the LDC * s see Cline (1981).
4
We refer to an inf lationary overhang as the stock of unspendahle
disposahle income in the household sector caused hy the repressed
inflation and shortages. See Kolodko (1985).
The inflation also reflects various political aspects, so the
complete explanation of this complicated process on a purely economic
hasis is simply impossihle. See, for instance, Hanke 1 and Issak
(1983).
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